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In 1962, F. N. David published her Games, Gods and Gambling as a supplement 
to Isaac Todhunter’s venerable History of the Mathematical Theory of Probability 
From the Time of Pascal to That of Laplace of 1865. Since the late 196Os, the 
history of probability theory and statistics has changed considerably. The output 
of articles and monographs in this field can be compared today with that in the 
history of analysis. However, authors of contributions to the history of stochastics 
have very different backgrounds and interests. I would like to distinguish four 
groups in this field: 
1. statisticians, probabilists, and historians of mathematics specializing in the 
history of stochastics, who are mainly concerned with the historical background 
of the mathematical concepts and tools of the subject, 
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2. historians of science (and of mathematics), who try to unravel the intellec- 
tual conditions which influenced in a positive or negative way the solution of 
certain problems in this field at a certain time, 
3. philosophers of science, who are mainly interested in the historical roots 
of different probability concepts or concepts such as determinism with a close 
connection to a certain understanding of probability, and 
4. historians of literature, who mine the riches of a probabilistic vocabulary 
in the literature of a certain epoch. 
In addition, there is a sociological interpretation as exemplified by MacKenzie’s 
Statistics in Britain [l]. 
These different aspects have opened new possibilities for a synthetic approach 
to the history of stochastics. Yet, the ideal of unifying all four of these groups, 
that is, of achieving a Gesamtkunstwerk, seems to be unattainable: these divergent 
approaches to the subject have led to different evaluations and even to contradic- 
tions. Thus, intellectual historians of the second group have criticized the work of 
members of the first group as historically irrelevant and Whiggish, while members 
of the first category have felt uneasy with the results achieved in the other groups 
mainly because of mathematical shortcomings. 
Here, we have three books which, in different ways, offer some kind of synthesis 
and complement one another in a fertile way. In terms of a timescale, Daston’s 
book describes the ascendancy and decline of what she calls classical probability, 
roughly from Jakob Bernoulli to Poisson. Porter is concerned with statistical 
thinking in the time between 1820 and 1900, before its codification as mathematical 
statistics. Stigler covers the entire period from Jakob Bernoulli to 1900. 
Daston understands herself as an intellectual historian writing about ideas, 
“which certainly do not exhaust the whole of history, but . . . are as ‘real’ as any 
other part of it” (p. xvii). She labels her subject “classical probability”-bor- 
rowing the adjective from a now common expression for literature and music of 
the same period. She finds its origins sometime in the second half of the seventeenth 
century and its end around 1840, and she is interested in the specific criteria 
characterizing classical probability as a distinct stage in the development of mathe- 
matical probability theory, to be distinguished, for example, from the calculus of 
probabilities in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is very difficult not to 
be impressed by the originality of Daston’s approach and the abundance of well 
ordered materials in her portrait of classical probability. For those interested 
primarily in the mathematics, Daston provides an early warning that “the case of 
classical probability theory is less dramatic in a mathematical sense” (p. 5). 
Looking at the algebraic and analytical tools developed for probability theory by 
de Moivre and Laplace in the eighteenth century, however, one might think 
otherwise. More importantly, a closer look at the mathematics of probability 
calculus provides more evidence of the very discontinuity implied by Daston’s 
periodization. 
Among the six chapters which describe different aspects of “classical probabil- 
ity” the first, second, and fifth might be closest to the hearts of historians of 
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mathematics. In the first chapter, Daston asks which of the different qualitative 
notions of probability distinguished by Hacking [2] and Shapiro [3] became quanti- 
tative, and why. Out of a network of factors, she singles out quasi-quantified legal 
concepts such as expectation and evidence as the most important in encouraging 
the quantification of certain aspects of the probable. Daston treats the concept of 
quantitative expectation in close connection with probability as the central topic 
of chapter two. The understanding of probabilistic expectation mirrored, according 
to Daston, the “rational belief and action” of an elite represented by the “homme 
e’claire’.” She depicts classical probability as a more or less mathematically codified 
description of the rational behavior that occurs within this elite, which functions 
as a prescriptive model for the less enlightened. In the case of the St. Petersburg 
problem, a decision based on equity and mathematical expectation would lead to 
an economic disaster. Daniel Bernoulli sought to base a less disastrous and more 
rational decision on the concept of “moral expectation.” In contrast to “mathe- 
matical” expectation, or the product of value and probability, “moral” expectation 
involved utilities or relative values. As for the question whether the St. Petersburg 
problem was just a singular instance that demanded the use of a modified concept 
of expectation, Daston answers this by discussing the debate between Daniel 
Bernoulli and d’Alembert over the rationality of the decision to be inoculated. 
There is, however, a kind of asymmetry in the argument because Daniel Bernoulli, 
who introduced moral expectation with relative values in order to solve the St. 
Petersburg problem, used ordinary mathematical expectation for his plea in favor 
of inoculation, whereas his opponent d’Alembert advocated relative values con- 
cerning life expectancy. Daston would perhaps explain this asymmetry as exempli- 
fying the lack of criteria indicating when to apply which concept of expectation. 
This implies that d’Alembert is restored to full membership in the small group of 
probabilists describing the thought and practice of reasonable men. Histories of 
probability theory and statistics usually deny d’Alembert this status. So in Stigler’s 
book, d’Alembert figures only as Laplace’s patron, and Porter quotes De Morgan’s 
devastating reference to d’Alembert’s understanding of equipossibility (p. 75f.), 
which at least contributed to the negative image of d’Alembert in the history of 
probability. Daston succeeds in restoring d’Alembert’s just claims as a reasonable 
man by reconstructing at least two concepts of reasonableness for the eighteenth 
century which differ crucially from later understandings of reasonableness. 
The following two chapters deal with the theory and practice of risk, and then 
with associationist psychology and its influence on the concept of the probable. 
Chapter three, especially, is a gold mine of information on gambling and insurance 
practice in the eighteenth century. The fifth chapter is concerned with the attempts 
of enlightened probabilists like Jakob Bernoulli, de Moivre, Bayes, Condorcet, 
Laplace, and Poisson to apply the urn model to all kinds of induction problems. 
It is followed by the story of probabilistic penetration into the delicate realm of 
the moral sciences. The decline of classical probability is described in the epilogue 
in terms of a growing opposition to what were deemed unjustifiable applications 
and of a shift from the ideal of the homme e’claire’ to Quetelet’s homme moyen. 
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Daston’s book is great fun to read because of the variety of well chosen topics, 
thoughtfully interpreted and presented in a wonderful, rich language. Also, she 
extends considerably the range of subjects involved in the development of probabil- 
ity theory, and so displays an impressive independence of conventional approaches 
to its history. Precisely because of the richness of her account, I especially regret 
her reservations against more mathematically oriented interpretations, because 
they might well complement her own statements. 
Be this as it may, the author’s distinction between the legal roots of the quantifi- 
cation of probability and the result of this process should help to avoid the repeti- 
tion of the standard Whiggish statement that “Pascal and Fermat invented the 
calculus of probabilities in their 1654 correspondence” (p. 23). Neither Pascal, 
whose discussion of probabilism (including the use of “probabilite”) in his Lettres 
Prouinciales is notorious, nor Fermat used the word probability or any French 
equivalent of it in their correspondence on games of chance. Yet, the notion of 
probability is not subsumed within the concept of a contract based on equity as 
Daston assumes either (p. 28). I would rather build on Daston’s repeated statement 
that in the process of mathematization the original connotation of a concept is 
changed to explain the transition from a calculus based on legal expectation to an 
art of conjecturing based on probability and probabilistic expectation. It shows 
that Pascal’s or Huygens’ understanding of expectation is still the legal or legally 
codified economic concept of expectation based on equity, and that the mathemati- 
cal expectation understood as the product of value and the probability of achieving 
it was only available after Jakob Bernoulli. Bernoulli modified Huygens’ concept 
of expectation in a way that allowed him to identify it with probability in the sense 
of degree of certitude, as can be seen from his treatment of a marriage contract in 
the late 1680s [4]. 
Using an approach similar to Daston’s, Porter describes the development of 
statistical ideas in the nineteenth century as the combined result of many different 
factors outside the domain of mathematics. He makes his point very nicely in the 
conditional phrase: “If statistics were just mathematics, the ‘anticipations’ of the 
error theorists would leave little basis for the claim that Quetelet, Lexis, and 
Galton were original thinkers in this field” (p. 4). 
Porter portrays Quetelet as a Janus-faced man who, as a social physicist, ad- 
vertized ideas like the homme moyen to an amazed European audience and who, 
as a practising statistician, made no use of them. Nevertheless, his influence is 
seen much less in the development of special statistical techniques than in the 
creation of a general conviction “that statistical laws can prevail for a mass even 
when the constituent individuals are too numerous or too inscrutable for their 
actions to be understood in any detail.” (p. 55). At least for the social sciences, 
this did not mean that statistical laws were considered as only probable and, as 
such, as of inferior validity; on the contrary, statistical methods seemed appro- 
priate to “extend the certainty of sciences like astronomy and mechanics” (p. 69) 
to a domain of much higher complexity like the social sciences. This statement 
leads Porter to the strong claim that it was the success of Queteletian statistics in 
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the social domain which justified the application of statistical methods to physics, 
especially the kinetic theory of gases, and to heredity during the second half of 
the nineteenth century. 
In the second part, Porter is ready to concede that the “most sophisticated 
mathematics of the early nineteenth century grew out of the use of error theory in 
astronomy and related fields” (p. 91). He claims on the other hand that men outside 
the domain of error-theoretic applications prepared an understanding of “real 
variation in nature and society” (p. 91) and that this was the source of modern 
statistics. In this sense, Galton stated again and again that nearly everybody used 
the error curve in order to get rid of variation, whereas he was concerned with 
preserving and using it. As a matter of fact, one use would be to spare the effort 
of long series of individual measurements. Galton gives the example of finding the 
distribution of strength in a tribe by just counting the respective numbers of those 
able to draw two different bows of known stiffness. 
In part three, Porter’s concern shifts to determinism or, more precisely, to what 
has been termed by Hacking the “erosion of determinism.” Porter makes out the 
discussion of free will as a key factor in weakening the deterministic position in a 
way that could well prepare the way for the quantum physics of the 1920s to 
abandon the principle of causality. So physics was neither alone nor even the first, 
though it was the most influential field in which determinism was rejected. Charles 
Sanders Peirce offers a strong, though unrepresentative, case of a philosopher 
who insisted on contingency in nature before 1900. 
In the fourth and last part of his book, Porter concerns himself with the begin- 
nings of a mathematical statistics. Those who created this new field according to 
Porter did not depend so much on error theory, the mathematical side, but mainly 
on the successful applications of probabilistic ideas in the social and natural 
sciences. In contrast to Stigler, Porter gives considerable credit to a German 
probabilization of the social sciences between 1875 and 1880, though without 
diminishing the acomplishments of the English biometricians in the creation of 
mathematical statistics. Yet surprisingly, Porter considers not Fechner, with his 
posthumously published KolEektiuma$Qehue which is totally omitted in Stigler’s 
account, but Lexis, with his index of dispersion, as “the starting point for a thin 
but continuing continental tradition of statistical mathematics” (p. 254) whose 
“most important influence was exerted through the work of Francis Edgeworth 
and of Karl Pearson” (p. 255). In the evaluation of Edgeworth’s work, Porter 
follows Stigler. Stigler emphasizes Edgeworth’s importance despite his failure to 
initiate a statistical movement of his own brand, portraying him as the man who 
decisively influences Pearson by bringing him into the field and by offering him 
concepts and ideas which Pearson adapted to the needs of biometrics. It is in the 
treatment of the biometric school that Porter and Stigler share the most common 
ground, and it is there that the different approaches become most visible. Porter 
argues repeatedly that “those who applied statistical thinking to any of the sciences 
during the second half of the nineteenth century thought in terms of analogies with 
the social science of statistics” (p. 136). He offers Galton’s case as the most 
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convincing one for the role of such analogies in the development of statistical 
thinking by showing the transmission of such ideas as correlation in meteorology, 
and more importantly, the concepts of social statistics to Galton’s theory of pan- 
genesis, which induced his statistical investigation of heredity. For Porter, it was 
Galton’s experience with meteorology and heredity-and not a familiarity with 
error theory-that enabled him to recognize the same mathematical pattern in the 
interdependence or correlation of the measures of different parts of the human 
body (as in regression). In contrast to Stigler, Porter is much less concerned with 
the concrete data and calculations found in Galton’s papers than with the ideas 
external to mathematics which paved the way for the creation of Galton’s concepts. 
A comparison of Porter and Stigler reveals a fundamentally different view concern- 
ing the role played by mathematics in the history of statistics. 
Porter includes the mathematical development that accompanied the rise of 
statistical thinking, but only in a nontechnical, descriptive way; yet he argues that 
it played merely an auxiliary role in that rise. Stigler, on the other hand, uses the 
mathematics contained in the works of mainly the same authors as his primary 
source for reconstructing the conceptualization of statistics. With Porter, one gets 
a feeling for the historical background against which the main ideas in nineteenth- 
century statistics developed, for the intellectual obstacles overcome with it, and 
for its achievements as seen through the eyes of contemporaries. With Stigler, one 
gets a much more mathematically detailed account through the optic of one familiar 
with twentieth-century statistics. Whereas Porter claims for Galton the “invention 
of a method of correlation” (p. 294) as one of his greatest achievements, Stigler 
only concedes “that while there is justice in associating correlation with Galton, 
the concept in its narrow interpretation as a single number measuring a bivariate 
relationship played only a minor role in Galton’s own work” (p. 297). Galton, he 
adds, “did not develop the topic further” and left it to other “far more competent 
mathematicians” (p. 299). Porter, who puts great stress on the idea of correlation, 
does not care if and how this idea was applied by Galton. Instead, he has a 
wonderful story to tell based on the analogy between Galton’s gemmules and the 
members of a free political society. He tells why and how Galton expected in 
Hereditary Genius that “the doctrine of Pangenesis gives excellent materials for 
mathematical formulae. ’ ’ Respecting Porter’s objectives, a historian of mathemat- 
ics will be more than recompensed for the lack of mathematical detail by a rich, 
fascinating, elegantly and wittily written account of how statistics became a subject 
for mathematicians. 
It would be wrong, however, to think that Stigler’s more conservative approach, 
combining biographical material with a thorough analysis of the use of mathemati- 
cal concepts and tools, lacks explanatory power or deeper historical insights. 
Thus, both authors agree in the statement that sampling played almost no role in 
nineteenth-century statistics, but it is Stigler in the second of the three parts of 
his book who explains the absence of sampling in population statistics by the 
“Keverberg Dilemma”- a term with a good change of becoming a classic. In part 
two, Stigler deals with attempts to adapt the calculus of probabilities to the social 
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sciences. In part one, he describes the arsenal of concepts, methods, and applica- 
tions in the calculus of probabilities, and especially in error theory, that provided 
the framework within which the statistical methods of the nineteenth century grew. 
It covers the combination of observations from Cotes to Legendre, the estimation 
of a posteriori probabilities in the sense of Jakob Bernoulli up to the use of inverse 
probability in Bayes and Laplace, and what Stigler calls the “Gauss-Laplace 
synthesis”. This last term refers to the merger of two lines of development: “one 
the combination of observations through the aggregation of linearized equations 
of condition, the other the use of mathematical probability to assess uncertainty 
and make inferences” (p. 138). 
The third part shows the path statistics followed into the twentieth century by 
a suitable transformation of the concepts contained in the Gauss-Laplace synthe- 
sis. It is due to the work of three men-Galton, Edgeworth, and Pearson-who 
constructed a conceptual methodology which “dissipated the fog that had impeded 
progress for a century” (p. 265). Although he acknowledges that these men right- 
fully share the credit for this development by virtue of their mutual cooperation 
and influence, Stigler appears most sympathetic toward Edgeworth. Consider his 
characterization of Edgeworth as “the subtle theorist who, perhaps alone among 
Galton’s audience, saw through the vagaries of Galton’s prose and was able to 
translate the ideas to a generalizable mathematical form, eventually permitting a 
much broader and more fruitful application than Galton had envisaged” and who 
possessed a “depth of understanding” Pearson lacked (p. 266). Relative to Edge- 
worth, we find Stigler in the perhaps unconscious role of a Don Quixote fighting 
for lady Truth against the windmills of historical impact. It could be that this 
attitude is also responsible for Stigler’s refusal to bow to the princeps mathemati- 
corum, Gauss, who deserve more attention than the severe criticism leveled against 
his 1809 proof of the method of least squares in the Theoria motus. 
In some way these preferences can be justified by Stigler’s concentration on 
significant case studies that seem most appropriate for his line of thought. This 
relatively selective treatment of the material, in comparison to Daston and Porter, 
permits historical delicacies where Stigler displays his impressive critical and 
analytical powers combined with his accurate knowledge of the source material 
and his readiness to check the smallest details of the mathematical manipulations 
in his sources. For example, when reevaluating Jakob Bernoulli’s proof of his main 
theorem, Stigler states that Bernoulli’s “actual result was deeper, subtler, more 
precise, more difficult, and more ambitious than the simple and elementary state- 
ment of the weak law of large numbers” and yet “in a sense a failure, both in fact 
and in Bernoulli’s eyes.” (p. 66). The “in fact” indicates that Stigler, in contrast 
to Daston and Porter, nearly never forgets to inform his reader about the relative 
achievements judged from a modern point of view. 
More mathematically oriented readers will certainly feel more at home with 
Stigler’s clear exposition. However, the comparison of these three distinguished 
and distinctive contributions to the history of stochastics is not a matter of better 
or worse. For the open-minded reader, there is no way out of the dilemma of 
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buying three books, which while different in approach, complement one another 
and represent the various states of the historical art. 
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